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Procurement is the main way to obtain goods or service for an agency. In order 
to get a nice price, the agency used to set up an auction or a bargaining to choose the 
best supplier in the potential sellers. At present, they begin to try a complex form to 
do the procurement. That is action-bargaining mechanism which is an auction 
followed by bargaining. It seems to bring more profit than the previous single 
mechanism to the auctioneer. In our experiment, we have set up UC and C 
treatments to study the individual behavior and the market efficiency. Although they 
have the same theoretical equilibrium, the individuals have the different behavior in 
those two treatments. We have set up four hypothesizes: Firstly, the auction followed 
by TOL offer mechanism is better than pure English auction on buyer’s side. 
Secondly, the buyer(auctioneer)’s optimal offer is the half of his value when he 
rejects the auction price, and the buyer accepts the auction price when the price is 
higher than the optimal offer. Thirdly, in the auction phase, the sellers always bid 
their cost. Fourthly, the winner always accepts the offer when the offer is higher than 
his cost, otherwise he rejects it. After our experiment and data analysis, we found 
that the auction-bargaining mechanism was superior to pure English auction in some 
ways. Most of the bidders bided their cost and most of the buyer chose the offer 
which is relative to his value and the auction price. The more interesting thing is that 
the bidders in the C treatment bided high price than the other treatment. 
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   拍卖作为一种特殊的买卖方式，最早可追溯到公元前 5 世纪的巴比伦，古希
腊历史学家希罗多德在他所著的《历史》一书中，记载了当时盛行的每年一次
的拍卖活动，拍卖的主要标的物是适婚年龄的妇女。 

































拍卖（The First-Price Sealed-bid Auction）和第二价格投标封闭式拍卖（The 














































































xi − maxj≠ibj    if bi > maxj≠ibj





βII (x) = x 
即每位投标者将以自己对商品价值估价作为投标价格。 
    而在第二价格封闭式拍卖中，价值估价为 x 的投标者的期望支付为： 
mII (x)   = Prob�赢得拍卖� × E�第二高的价值�x 是最高价值� 
                = H(x) × E[Y1|Y1 < 𝑥𝑥] 




























为 x 的投标者的期望支付为： 










假定有 N 个竞标者在一个逆向拍卖里，c 代表一个竞标者的真实成本，F(c)
则代表成本 c 的分布函数。在第一价格封闭式逆向拍卖中，对称的均衡策略为： 
p(c) = E[Y1|Y1 > 𝑐𝑐] = c +
∫ [1 − F(ξ)]n−1dξc�c
[1 − F(ξ)]n−1  
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